"Japan Launched the World's First Wooden Satellite Using Ancient Carpentry": Space Security Expert Sylwia Gorska Talks U.S-Japan Alliance, Japan's Pacifism as a Strategic Advantage

As North Korean missiles threaten Japanese airspace and Chinese satellites multiply in low Earth orbit, the future of space security is being written not in the Pentagon's corridors but in the quiet laboratories of Kyoto University. There, engineers are constructing satellites from wood—actual wood—using traditional Japanese joinery techniques that haven't changed in centuries.

Ancient precision cuts that lock wood together without metal fasteners—now applied to humanity's newest frontier.

While America builds missile interceptors and tracks hypersonic threats, Japan has positioned itself as the global leader in space sustainability—the unglamorous but critical work of ensuring our orbital highways don't become permanent junkyards. The LingoSat (the world’s first wooden satellite) launched aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 in November 2024, represents something revolutionary: proof that the constraints of pacifism can drive innovation rather than limit it.

Kyoto University's Takao Doi hols a prototype of the world’s first wooden satellite—part of Japan’s push toward sustainable, low-debris orbital technology that challenges traditional space development paradigms.

"Japan is really excelling in this area," explains Sylwia Gorska, a PhD candidate at the University of Central Lancashire whose research examines Japan-U.S. alliance dynamics in space security. "What I've noticed through my research is that Japan is focusing more on space sustainability, whereas the U.S. is looking more into defense and deterrence capabilities."

Gorska's journey to this insight began by accident. Originally focused on Japan-South Korea relations and historical grievances, she stumbled upon articles about space governance and debris mitigation. "That opened up whole new ideas for my PhD," she recalls. "I noticed that Japan is really excelling in this area and thought, how do they cooperate together with the U.S.? How does it fit within Japan's pacifist identity?"

The answer reveals a partnership where constitutional constraints have become catalysts for innovation, and where the future of space may depend as much on Japanese wooden satellites as American missile interceptors.

How do you assess the current state of the Japan–U.S. alliance in the context of space security, and what are the most significant challenges or opportunities you see emerging in the next five years?

The Japan–U.S. space security alliance has reached an unprecedented level of depth and integration. “It’s stronger and more multi-dimensional than ever,” Gorska explains. “What sets it apart isn’t just how much the two countries are working together, but how deeply their efforts are intertwined—across defense, civil space exploration, advanced technology, and long-term sustainability.”

Recent milestones highlight this evolution. In February 2025, the U.S. Space Force launched a space domain awareness payload aboard Japan's Quasi-Zenith Satellite-6—marking "the first bilateral national security space mission between Japan and the U.S.," Gorska notes, though the two countries have long cooperated on broader defense initiatives such as missile defense and radar integration.

Table 1: Japan-U.S. Space Cooperation Timeline

The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) is Japan’s regional navigation system, offering enhanced GPS-like services across East Asia and Oceania. Unlike traditional GPS satellites orbiting at roughly 20,000 kilometers, these quasi-zenith satellites follow elliptical orbits that keep them high over Japan for extended periods—hence the term “quasi-zenith.” Their unique positioning makes them ideal platforms for hosting additional payloads, like surveillance sensors. “The system now delivers near real-time tracking data to the U.S. Space Surveillance Network,” Gorska says, “which boosts both nations’ ability to monitor activity in geosynchronous orbit—the critical band for military and communications satellites.”

The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) 

She stresses this is more than just cooperation. “This kind of mission goes far beyond coordination,” she says. “It’s about sharing assets and capabilities to strengthen deterrence and enhance regional security. That makes this defense partnership all the more vital.”

Japan has also become a key civilian partner for NASA. “They’re providing critical hardware for the Gateway lunar station and co-developing the lunar cruiser—a pressurized rover that lets astronauts live and work on the Moon for extended periods, which is pretty exciting,” Gorska says with a smile. “Even more historic, NASA has allocated two lunar landing seats to Japanese astronauts. That speaks volumes about the level of trust and ambition in the relationship.”

Looking ahead, Gorska sees the greatest potential in sustainability. “I think one of the most promising areas for U.S.–Japan collaboration is space sustainability,” she explains. “Japan is already leading the way with missions like ADRAS-J, led by Astroscale Japan, which is among the first commercial efforts to approach large space debris for potential removal. That’s exactly the kind of work the U.S. and Japan can scale together—not just building systems for defense and exploration, but ensuring space remains usable long-term. That means tackling debris and helping shape global norms around responsible behavior in orbit.”

How have public attitudes in Japan toward space security and military use of space evolved since the 2008 Basic Space Law, and what impact does this have on alliance cooperation with the U.S.?

The transformation of Japanese public opinion on space security marks one of the most significant shifts in postwar policy—one that requires revisiting decades of constitutional interpretation. “Before 2008, Japan’s space activities were constrained by a strict 1969 Diet resolution that limited space use to peaceful, non-military purposes,” Gorska explains.

That 1969 resolution emerged during the height of the Cold War, when Japan’s parliament passed a measure stating that the country’s space development should be restricted to “peaceful purposes only.” Though deliberately ambiguous, the phrase was widely interpreted to exclude any military or defense-related space activities. For nearly four decades, this interpretation effectively prevented Japan from developing military satellites, engaging in missile defense, or using space for intelligence gathering—severely limiting its ability to respond to regional security threats using space-based tools. “But the 2008 law marked a turning point,” Gorska says. “It allowed Japan to use space for national security and slowly opened the door to public acceptance of military-related space activities, so long as they align with Japan’s defensive posture and pacifist constitution.”

This change didn’t happen in isolation. “Several regional security developments helped drive the shift,” she notes. “North Korea’s repeated missile tests and China’s anti-satellite weapon demonstrations—especially its 2007 ASAT test—made the public more aware that space isn’t just about science or exploration anymore. It’s a domain of national defense.”

China's 2007 ASAT Test – The Dawn of Orbital WeaponizationA KT-2 missile launched from Xichang destroyed the FY-1C weather satellite in low Earth orbit, marking the first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test and triggering global concern over the militarization of space.

China’s 2007 anti-satellite test was a watershed moment. On January 11, 2007, China launched a ground-based missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites, Fengyun-1C, creating over 3,000 pieces of trackable debris. The test demonstrated a direct-ascent ASAT capability capable of targeting satellites in orbit, sending shockwaves through the international community. For Japan—heavily dependent on satellite-based communications and navigation—it was a wake-up call. “That demonstration of destructive capability by Japan’s largest neighbor was particularly alarming,” Gorska says.

Since then, public opinion has evolved—though not without limits. “Today, polls consistently show majority support for strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities, including space-based systems like surveillance and missile warning, so long as these are seen as defensive rather than offensive,” she observes. “There’s still some division within the public, but as long as the systems are non-offensive, they get the green light.”

This shift has had direct implications for alliance cooperation. “It’s had a clear impact on U.S.–Japan defense collaboration,” she explains. “Japan’s Ministry of Defense is now investing in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and it’s partnering with the U.S. on joint missile detection and tracking—like the bilateral low Earth orbit missile detection constellation announced in 2024 to track hypersonic threats. A decade ago, this kind of cooperation would have faced much more domestic resistance, but today, public sentiment has moved in a more supportive direction.”

One of the clearest symbols of this shift is Japan’s willingness to host U.S. Space Force payloads on its satellites. “The launch of a U.S. space domain awareness payload aboard Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite-6 is a first-of-its-kind partnership,” Gorska says. “It reflects how rising public acceptance has made it politically viable for Japan to deepen defense cooperation with the U.S. in space.”

Still, that acceptance remains cautiously bounded. “In short, evolving public attitudes since 2008 have created political room—just a little room, not a big room yet—for Japan and the U.S. to build a much deeper space security partnership,” Gorska emphasizes. “That’s largely due to the threat from North Korea. Last year's missile test that flew over Japanese territory caused growing public awareness and helped create the momentum for closer cooperation with the U.S. on defense systems."

Dual-use technologies are increasingly central to space policy. What mechanisms or frameworks do you believe are most effective for Japan and the U.S. to jointly govern dual-use space technologies, especially considering the risks of proliferation and strategic ambiguity?

Managing dual-use technologies is one of the most complex aspects of Japan–U.S. space cooperation, largely due to the inherent ambiguity of systems that serve both civilian and military purposes. “That’s quite difficult,” Gorska acknowledges. “But if I had to sum up the key to making it work in one word: transparency. That’s the most important principle—transparency in all cooperation.”

At the core of this approach is sustained institutional dialogue. “Japan and the U.S. maintain a comprehensive space dialogue, where they meet annually to align policies, share concerns, and coordinate on sensitive issues like dual-use technologies—whether it’s missile tracking systems, satellite monitoring, or close proximity operations,” she explains.

In addition to regular discussions, both countries are working to establish formal mechanisms for technology sharing. “They’re negotiating the Japan–U.S. Space Technology Safeguards Agreement,” Gorska notes. “It’s still in development—it’s more like a set of evolving guidelines right now—but it’s designed to create a legal and technical framework that would allow U.S. companies to launch commercial missions from Japan while ensuring sensitive technologies are properly protected.”

Although the agreement hasn’t yet been finalized, Gorska views it as a critical milestone. “Even in its draft form, it’s an important step,” she says. “It opens the door to deeper industrial collaboration without increasing the risk of proliferation.”

The challenge is particularly nuanced in areas where Japan holds technical leadership—such as space debris mitigation and space situational awareness. These technologies are essential for long-term sustainability in orbit, but they also have clear military applications, including the ability to track, approach, or potentially disable satellites. “That’s where the dual-use issue becomes especially tricky,” she says. “The key is to maintain transparency about capabilities and intentions, while also creating clear, enforceable guidelines for technology transfer and information sharing.”

Space debris is a growing concern for all spacefaring nations. How is Japan, in collaboration with the U.S., approaching space debris mitigation, and are there specific policy gaps or technological hurdles that still need to be addressed?

Space debris mitigation reveals both the complementary strengths and inherent asymmetries within the Japan-U.S. space alliance. "With Japan and the U.S. cooperating in space, there is quite a bit of alliance asymmetry," Gorska explains frankly. "There are different priorities because of Japan's constitutional restrictions. Japan cannot really match U.S. military capabilities. So what I've noticed through my research is that Japan is focusing more on space sustainability, whereas the U.S. is looking more into defense and deterrence capabilities."

Visual 1: Alliance Asymmetry - Complementary Capabilities

This division of labor has created complementary, but unequal, approaches. "They're working closely together on space debris mitigation, but Japan is leading in sustainability through missions like the ADRAS-J mission by Astroscale," she notes. "The U.S., on the other hand, is taking the lead in space situational awareness, where Japan shares radar and optical tracking data with the U.S., which strengthens the broader Space Surveillance Network. This helps monitor orbital objects—of course, the space debris—and predict potential collisions and issue timely warnings."

Japan’s ADRAS-J Mission Approaches Rocket Debris in Orbit

However, this collaboration creates significant dependencies. "This combined SSA effort improves the resilience of both countries' space operations and enhances global space traffic management. However, Japan relies on U.S. space situational awareness—this is one of the asymmetries within the alliance," Gorska acknowledges. "Japan also depends on U.S. defense capabilities, both on Earth and in space."

Despite these dependencies, Japan is establishing genuine leadership in debris mitigation. "Having said that, Japan is becoming a leader in space debris mitigation, alongside other major international efforts by ESA, NASA, and private companies," she emphasizes. "The most important project is the ADRAS-J mission. This successfully demonstrated the ability to closely approach and inspect a large piece of space debris, which is a vital technical step toward eventually capturing and removing big objects."

Visual 2: Detailed Capability Analysis

Even more innovative is Japan's focus on preventative measures through revolutionary materials science. "I think the most important aspect of Japan's approach to space debris mitigation is its preventative measures," Gorska explains. "Japan is really investing in innovation in preventative measures through space debris mitigation. For example, they designed projects like LignoSat, which is the world's first wooden satellite, developed by Kyoto University."

The LignoSat project represents perhaps the most creative approach to debris reduction ever attempted, challenging fundamental assumptions about space-grade materials. Traditional satellites are built from metals and composites that can persist in orbit for decades or even centuries after their missions end. When these satellites eventually re-enter Earth's atmosphere, they create toxic aluminum oxide particles that could potentially affect the ozone layer. Wood, by contrast, burns up completely during atmospheric re-entry, leaving no harmful residue. "This specific project is so unusual, as it was constructed using Honoki, which is Japanese magnolia wood, and assembled primarily with traditional Japanese joinery techniques, though some internal components may still require small fasteners for electronic systems," Gorska describes with evident fascination. Honoki wood has been used in traditional Japanese construction for over a millennium, prized for its workability, dimensional stability, and resistance to warping—qualities that make it surprisingly suitable for the extreme temperature variations of space.

Close-Up of LignoSat’s Honoki Wood Frame with Precision Joinery

The mission's objectives went far beyond demonstration. "During its mission, it collected data on how it responds to the harsh space environment, including radiation and extreme temperatures. These findings contribute to the exploration of eco-friendly materials for space applications, offering potential alternatives that would reduce long-term debris and environmental risks."

Visual 3: Alliance Asymmetry - Complementary Capabilities

The project's timeline demonstrates Japan's commitment to innovation: "It was launched aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket in November 2024 and deployed from the International Space Station. This mission was successfully completed and collected significant data on the potential use of wooden materials."

This represents a fundamental shift in thinking about space sustainability—from managing debris after it's created to prevent it in the first place, through innovative materials and design approaches that challenge conventional assumptions about space technology.

Given Japan's proximity to China and North Korea, how does its approach to space security within the U.S. alliance framework differ from that of other U.S. allies, and what unique strategic considerations shape Japan's space policy?

Japan’s geographic position places it in direct proximity to two of the United States’ most capable adversaries—China and North Korea—creating immediate and existential threats that set its approach to space security apart from other U.S. allies. "First of all, North Korea's increased missile launches over Japanese territory have caused heightened public concern," Gorska explains. “There’s also growing Chinese activity in space, including the launch of mega constellations of satellites and, unfortunately, the accompanying debris that every launch inevitably generates.”

These regional threats have pushed Japan to pursue deeper and more specific cooperation with the U.S., extending beyond typical alliance structures. “In response to all that, Japan has intensified its collaboration with the United States on space-based missile detection and tracking systems,” she notes. “In 2024, both countries announced the development of a low Earth orbit missile detection constellation to enhance early warning capabilities against regional missile threats.”

Japan is also participating in cutting-edge defense programs that test the limits of its constitutional framework. “Additionally, Japan is involved in the U.S.-led Glide Phase Interceptor program to counter hypersonic weapons during their glide phase,” Gorska says. “That’s especially important given how far North Korea’s missile technology has advanced. These two programs are already operational, and Japan and the U.S. are working closely on both.”

UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in Session

Yet, unlike most other U.S. allies, Japan must constantly navigate the constraints of its pacifist constitution. “Of course, Japan has to be very careful to stay within the boundaries of its constitutional restrictions,” she emphasizes. “It’s quite difficult, and I don’t believe the constitution will be amended any time soon.”

Still, Gorska believes this strategic restraint may need to be reevaluated. “That said, I think it’s something they should be doing now,” she argues. “With geopolitical tensions rising, Japan needs to have its own defense capabilities in place.”

Japan’s approach is also shaped by the regional context in a way that differs from other allies. In addition to its bilateral cooperation with the U.S., Japan actively engages in trilateral frameworks. “The most recent collaboration was at the Camp David summit in 2023, when the U.S., Japan, and South Korea signed an agreement to share early warning information on missile threats,” she recalls.

That summit marked a historic moment: the first-ever meeting between the leaders of all three nations at the presidential retreat. It was driven by escalating threats from North Korea, including its development of submarine-launched and intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching all three countries. The resulting agreement established real-time protocols for sharing launch detection data, tracking information, and trajectory analysis—forming a trilateral early warning network that significantly enhances each nation’s ability to respond.

Leaders of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea at Camp David

On August 18th, 2024 President Joe Biden hosts South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Camp David, marking a historic trilateral summit focused on regional security, technology cooperation, and space strategy alignment.

“This was a particularly meaningful step,” Gorska notes, “especially considering the historical tensions between Japan and South Korea. Those long-standing grievances had made security cooperation challenging, despite both countries being U.S. allies.”

Unlike European NATO allies, who can engage in collective defense operations, or Australia, which operates in a different regional context, Japan must frame all of its military cooperation in explicitly defensive terms—while simultaneously facing two near-peer adversaries in its immediate neighborhood. This creates a unique strategic dynamic: Japan is both more dependent on U.S. defense capabilities and more innovative in developing alternatives to offset its constitutional limitations.

The result is an alliance that is at once more integrated and more constrained than other U.S. partnerships. “Ironically, Japan’s limitations have pushed it to lead in areas like space sustainability—technologies that all U.S. allies ultimately need,” Gorska concludes.

In your research, have you observed any shifts in Japan's willingness to participate in multilateral space governance initiatives, and how does the Japan–U.S. partnership influence broader international norms on space security and responsible behavior?

Japan’s approach to multilateral space governance has undergone a profound transformation, reflecting both its emergence as a confident space power and its longstanding diplomatic strategy of promoting responsible leadership through soft power. “Over the past few years, Japan has notably expanded its engagement in multilateral space governance,” Gorska observes. “It reflects a strategic shift toward deeper international collaboration in outer space.”

This shift is most clearly visible in Japan’s active leadership within the United Nations system. “One significant development is Japan’s proactive role in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” she explains. “Just this February, Japan implemented national guidelines to prevent satellite collisions, aligning with the UN’s space debris mitigation and long-term sustainability frameworks.”

For Japan, participation in multilateral governance is about more than compliance—it’s an extension of its identity. “This move underscores Japan’s commitment to promoting responsible behavior in space and to helping establish global norms around sustainability,” Gorska says. “It’s extremely important for Japan to be viewed as a responsible global actor in space. That stems from its pacifist identity. They position themselves as pioneers in space governance and sustainability.”

This identity-driven approach is driving broader international engagement. “That’s why they’ve increased participation in multilateral organizations and global cooperation on space governance,” she adds.

The Japan–U.S. partnership plays a pivotal role in shaping these broader norms. “Their bilateral collaboration has become instrumental in defining global space governance,” Gorska explains. “Through the U.S.–Japan comprehensive dialogue on space, both countries are aligning their policies on space security and exploration while working together to develop norms for transparency and responsible behavior.”

This goes beyond mutual capability-building—it’s norm-setting. “The cooperation not only strengthens their respective systems,” she emphasizes, “but also sets a model for international standards. Other countries are looking to these bilateral frameworks—especially on issues like dual-use technology—as templates for how to implement transparency and governance within their own partnerships.”

Japan’s leadership is also reflected in its role within key multilateral frameworks such as the Artemis Accords. “Japan’s involvement in the Artemis Accords further underscores its commitment to multilateral governance,” Gorska says. “As one of the original signatories, Japan actively supports principles like peaceful exploration, transparency, and sustainable space activity.”

Artemis Accords Signatories: A Global Alliance for Peaceful Space Exploration

Over 50 nations have joined the Artemis Accords, committing to transparency, sustainability, and cooperation in humanity’s return to the Moon and beyond.

The Artemis Accords, launched by the U.S. in 2020, represent a new model of space governance built around bilateral agreements among like-minded nations. They outline standards for lunar exploration, such as system interoperability, space object registration, emergency assistance, and preservation of historic lunar sites. “Japan was among the first eight countries to sign, alongside Australia, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, the U.K., and the UAE,” she notes. “That early support helped legitimize the framework and accelerate its global adoption.”

The results speak for themselves. “As of May 2025, the Accords have been signed by 55 countries,” Gorska points out. “That shows growing international consensus on responsible space conduct—and Japan’s early participation played a key role in that success.”

Visual 4: Global Space Governance: Artemis Accords Success

But Japan’s influence doesn’t stop at diplomacy—it extends to how countries think about space governance itself. Its emphasis on sustainability, reinforced by tangible innovation—such as the wooden satellite project and debris mitigation missions—demonstrates that environmental responsibility can go hand-in-hand with technological leadership. “Japan is showing that stewardship doesn’t limit progress,” Gorska concludes. “It can actually drive it.”

Looking ahead, what areas of space collaboration between Japan and the U.S. do you consider most promising—such as lunar exploration, commercial partnerships, or military space operations—and what policy recommendations would you offer to strengthen these ties?

Looking to the future, Gorska envisions the Japan–U.S. space partnership evolving in bold new directions that extend well beyond traditional government-to-government frameworks. “I see the Japan–U.S. space partnership expanding in several new and promising areas that go beyond what we've seen over the past decade,” she says.

Visual 5: Multi-Domain Space Cooperation Framework

1. Innovation and Emerging Technologies

Gorska identifies next-generation technology as the most promising frontier for collaboration—particularly where artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing intersect. “There’s clear momentum in AI, robotics, and other emerging technologies,” she notes. “I think the future of this partnership lies in innovation, and that also means investment. If Japan and the U.S. are willing to invest jointly in emerging technologies that enhance space capabilities, that would be amazing.”

She sees a natural synergy in sustainability-related tech. “There’s real room for growth in space sustainability—both on the innovation side and in terms of financial investment. Japan and the U.S. could collaborate even further in that space.”

2. Advanced Civil Space Cooperation

Japan’s role in the Artemis program marks just the beginning of a deeper civil space relationship. “From the civil side, Japan’s participation in Artemis isn’t just about headline projects like the lunar cruiser or Japanese astronauts on the Moon,” she explains. “It’s also about advancing the next phase of innovation, which again, depends on strategic investment and finance.”

She highlights life-support and energy systems as a particularly rich area for cooperation. “For example, working on compact nuclear or hydrogen-based power for long-duration missions could be pivotal,” she suggests. “That’s where Japan’s engineering strength—especially in nuclear and hydrogen—complements the U.S.’s deep space infrastructure.”

Japan’s decades of leadership in peaceful nuclear power and hydrogen fuel cell technology—pioneered by firms like Toyota and Honda—position it well for this role. Japan’s space agency, JAXA, is already developing small-scale nuclear systems and has experience with RTGs, making it a vital contributor to future lunar and Mars missions where solar energy may fall short.

3. Commercial Sector Transformation

Gorska sees perhaps the most transformative opportunities emerging in the commercial sector. “The U.S.–Japan relationship is shifting beyond traditional government partnerships,” she says. “We’re now seeing direct cross-investment and tech-sharing between startups in both countries.”

She highlights high-growth areas such as in-orbit servicing, next-gen communications, and sustainable satellite manufacturing. “The LignoSat wooden satellite demonstration, for example, has drawn interest from U.S. firms exploring eco-friendly materials,” she notes. “That’s a perfect example of how future cooperation could expand—not just government to government, but also through private sector and startup partnerships.”

4. Defense Integration and Interoperability

On the defense front, Gorska envisions a shift toward deeper integration that could reshape alliance dynamics. “When it comes to defense, the focus is moving beyond joint missile tracking or hypersonic defense,” she explains. “It’s about building truly interoperable command-and-control systems.”

This would mean tighter Japanese integration into U.S.-led architectures like the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) network. “The goal is real-time data sharing—across space, cyber, and air domains—so both nations can respond together in a crisis,” she says. “And that kind of interoperability is especially crucial given Japan’s proximity to China and North Korea.”

Visual 6: Future Collaboration Areas

Policy Recommendations

To strengthen these emerging ties, Gorska offers three key policy recommendations:

1. Invest in dual-use innovation: “Japan and the U.S. should prioritize joint investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defense needs—especially in sustainability,” she says. “That would create long-term strategic advantages.”
2. Expand public–private collaboration: “Bringing more commercial companies and startups into the fold is critical,” she argues. “Government alone can’t drive the level of innovation needed. Public–private partnerships will unlock faster, more flexible growth.”
3. Leverage Japan’s unique strengths: “Japan’s leadership in sustainability shouldn’t be viewed as a consolation for constitutional constraints,” she emphasizes. “It’s a strategic advantage—one that benefits not only the bilateral alliance but the global community.”

What the World Can Learn from Japan's Approach

Gorska concludes with a broader reflection on Japan’s distinctive role in global space governance—and what it reveals about alternative models of national power in space. “I believe Japan’s commitment to space sustainability is something to be admired,” she says. “Not only in terms of real-time innovation, but also in how they think ahead—considering long-term goals and the preventative measures that all nations and space agencies need to prioritize.”

Table 3: Japan's Space Diplomacy Model vs. Traditional Approaches

What sets Japan apart, she explains, is its temporal mindset. “Japan stands out because they think generationally. They’re exploring new materials for satellite construction, yes—but it goes beyond that. They truly invest in innovation, not just in defense capabilities. They see space as something that must remain usable for the next generation.”

This future-focused perspective is deeply rooted in Japan’s cultural values. “It reflects Japan’s national identity,” Gorska explains. “You can see it in how they live—in harmony. That sense of harmony extends to how they approach outer space, climate change, and other non-traditional security issues. They consistently think beyond themselves. It’s a mindset of cooperation, of thinking about the collective good.”

Visual 7: The Japanese Model

For Gorska, Japan’s example holds a powerful diplomatic lesson. “This is the Japanese way of diplomacy,” she concludes. “It’s a way of cooperating that centers on responsibility, harmony, and future generations. And it’s something the world can learn from—not just in space, but in how we approach global challenges more broadly.”

Author's Analysis: The Quiet Revolution in Space Security

Sylwia Gorska's research reveals a profound shift in how we should think about space security—one that challenges conventional assumptions about military deterrence and national power in orbit. Her work demonstrates that Japan's constitutional constraints, rather than limiting its space capabilities, have driven genuine innovation in the most critical challenge facing the space age: sustainability.

The wooden satellite project represents more than an engineering curiosity. It symbolizes a fundamentally different approach to space development—one that prioritizes long-term usability over short-term advantage. While other nations race to deploy ever-larger constellations of satellites, Japan asks a more fundamental question: How do we ensure space remains usable for future generations?

This approach has yielded unexpected strategic advantages. Japan's leadership in space debris mitigation has positioned it as an indispensable partner not just for the United States, but for any nation serious about long-term space activities. As orbital debris becomes an increasingly urgent problem, Japan's innovations in both active debris removal and prevention through eco-friendly materials become globally valuable.

The alliance asymmetry Gorska identifies—with Japan relying on U.S. space situational awareness and defense capabilities while leading in sustainability—reveals both the strengths and vulnerabilities of this partnership. Japan's dependence on American systems for tracking and defense creates obvious strategic risks, but it also drives Japan toward innovations that ultimately benefit both nations.

Perhaps most significantly, Gorska's research suggests that constitutional constraints can become sources of comparative advantage rather than limitations. Japan's inability to develop offensive space capabilities has pushed it toward sustainability technologies that are becoming increasingly valuable as space becomes more crowded and contested. In a domain where debris from one nation's activities can threaten everyone else's assets, Japan's "harmonious approach" to space development may prove the most strategically valuable of all.

The evolution of Japanese public opinion since 2008 demonstrates how external threats can gradually shift domestic political constraints, but within careful bounds. The "slight room, not big room" that Gorska identifies for expanded defense cooperation suggests that Japan's approach will continue to be shaped by constitutional considerations, potentially driving continued innovation in dual-use technologies that serve both civilian and military purposes.

Looking ahead, the Japan-U.S. partnership may represent a model for how different national strengths and constraints can create synergistic rather than competitive relationships. Japan's pacifist identity drives innovation in sustainability, while U.S. defense capabilities provide security. Together, they're creating a framework for space cooperation that other alliances might emulate—one where different nations contribute according to their strengths rather than trying to replicate each other's capabilities.

As commercial space activities accelerate and more nations develop space capabilities, the Japanese model suggests that long-term strategic advantage may come not from the ability to weaponize space, but from the ability to keep it peaceful, sustainable, and usable for all. In this context, Japan's wooden satellites and debris removal missions may prove more strategically important than conventional military space systems.

The question for policymakers is whether other nations can learn from Japan's approach—using their own constraints and cultural values as drivers of innovation rather than obstacles to overcome. As Gorska's research demonstrates, the most significant contributions to space security may come not from those with the most powerful military space capabilities, but from those who can solve the collective action problems that threaten everyone's access to space.

About Sylwia M. Gorska

Sylwia M. Gorska is an expert in East Asian international relations and Japan's foreign policy, currently completing her PhD in International Relations at the University of Central Lancashire (UK). Her doctoral research examines Japan-U.S. alliance dynamics in space debris mitigation, analyzing how space sustainability challenges intersect with alliance politics, dual-use technology dilemmas, and Japan's pacifist identity.

Her interest in space security emerged unexpectedly, sparked by a growing recognition that rapid technological advances in space are generating complex security and governance challenges. What began as a chance discovery evolved into a focused research agenda on space security within the broader international relations landscape.

Her wider expertise includes the political and strategic implications of emerging technologies, space innovation, nuclear energy, and the evolving security architecture of East Asia. She also holds a Master's degree in International Relations from the same institution, where her dissertation focused on Japan-South Korea bilateral relations and the diplomatic management of historical grievances.

For more information, reach out to Sylwia at SMGorska1@uclan.ac.uk 

For further reading, read Sylwia’s publication on Nuclear Safety and Energy Security via the Global Taiwan Institute.