The threats arrive in fragments: a Chinese satellite suddenly maneuvering close to an American military spacecraft, its purpose unknown. A burst of radio interference that scrambles GPS signals over European airports, forcing pilots to revert to backup navigation. Intelligence reports suggesting Russia is developing a nuclear weapon designed to detonate in space, creating an electromagnetic pulse that could cripple thousands of satellites simultaneously. From her office in Washington D.C.'s Dupont Circle, Victoria Samson pieces together these scattered incidents into patterns, tracking what she calls "the most complex and challenging strategic environment" space has ever seen.

For sixteen years, Samson has worked on space security issues for the Secure World Foundation, a non-profit that promotes the long-term sustainable use of space. Part of that work includes co-editing SWF's annual Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source  Assessment, currently in its eighth year, where she works to transform technical reports, budget documents, and satellite tracking data into definitive analysis of military counterspace capabilities across twelve nations. Her work has documented everything from China's coordinated satellite maneuvers that the U.S. Space Force labeled "dogfighting" to Russia's development of nuclear anti-satellite weapons. But her greatest concern isn't the weapons themselves—it's the words being used to describe them.

Her concern isn't just about the weapons being developed—it's about the words being used to describe them. With the U.S. Space Force calling space a "warfighting domain" and Chinese satellite maneuvers labeled "dogfighting," Samson warns that inflammatory rhetoric could "speak ourselves into a conflict" that doesn't need to happen. With the United States operating over 8,900 of the world's 12,400 active satellites, America has the most to lose from an escalating space arms race.

Tell us about your background. What was the initial spark that got you interested in space security?

“I had zero interest in space growing up,” Samson confirms with a laugh. “A lot of people I work with on space issues have always been like, ‘Oh, when I was a child, I used to look at the stars and dream of being up there.’ I know people who have actually been to space. I know a lot of people who went to space camp as kids. None of that for me. Zero interest in space.”

“I was much more interested in international relations and development,” she continues. “When I graduated from high school, that was right when the Berlin Wall fell. So by the time I got to college, I was very focused on international development. That’s really what I cared about.”

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked a pivotal moment for students like Samson who were drawn to diplomacy, reconstruction, and the reshaping of global institutions. As Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics began transitioning out of communism, many young professionals saw an opportunity to help rebuild societies and support emerging democracies.

Her path to space security was anything but straightforward. After completing graduate studies in international relations and international economics, she initially set her sights on the State Department and hoped to become a foreign service officer. Although she passed the written portion of the foreign service exam, she didn’t make it through the oral component.

“Most of my classmates either went to the State Department or the World Bank,” she explains. “But that wasn’t available because of a government hiring freeze. Defense contractors, on the other hand, are always hiring. So I applied and got a job as a subcontractor for a company doing war-gaming scenarios for what is now the Missile Defense Agency.”

For many international relations grads shut out of public service in the 1990s, defense contracting offered a viable alternative. With the Cold War over, defense contractors were expanding their analytical work to address new and emerging threats. That environment offered a crash course in complex strategic thinking and operational modeling. “I remember my first day on the job—they were talking about the red team versus the blue team, and I had no idea what they meant. I had to learn everything from scratch.” The red team versus blue team methodology became a standard approach in defense analysis during the post-Cold War period, with "red teams" representing adversary forces and "blue teams" representing friendly forces in war gaming scenarios.

Samson eventually moved into arms control work, joining a coalition focused on nuclear issues and missile defense. When the organization dissolved following 9/11, she was recruited by someone who had previously served as the Pentagon’s top weapons tester and was then working at the Center for Defense Information. “Because of his interests, I learned a lot more about missile defense from an analytical perspective. I also started learning about chemical and biological weapons, and about UAVs. That was the first time I ever heard the word ‘Predator.’ I was like, ‘From the movies?’ And he said, ‘No, unmanned drones.’”

At the time, the MQ-1 Predator was still a relatively new and obscure surveillance platform. In the early 2000s, it was just beginning to transition from reconnaissance to an armed drone central to U.S. counterterrorism operations—a transformation still largely unknown to the broader public.

This was also the period when the George W. Bush administration revived Reagan-era ideas about space-based missile defense, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Those proposals included stationing interceptors in space—a highly controversial prospect. “Space-based interceptors were being discussed as kind of an offshoot or extension of missile defense. So I started following space security issues as part of that.”

When the Secure World Foundation decided to establish a Washington, D.C., office, they reached out to Samson because of her missile defense work. “They said, ‘Hey, would you like to apply for this position?’ And I thought, ‘Oh my God, no. Space is boring.’ But I had moved to Texas for personal reasons and I was looking for a way to get back to D.C., so I told myself, ‘I’ll apply, and if I get it, great. I’ll do it for maybe a year or two, refresh my contacts, and then move on to greener pastures.’”

That was 16 years ago. “I love it. I never would have expected that. But there’s so much international relations and geopolitics involved in space issues. It’s been fascinating to see how much that affects decision-making, investment, and force structure.”

What does your Global Counterspace Threat Assessment report cover, and what sets it apart from other analyses?

"One of my big projects I do every year at Secure World Foundation is our Global Counterspace Threat Assessment, where we look at open-source information about counterspace capabilities for, now, 12 countries. We started eight years ago with six countries, so we've doubled the number of countries and doubled the size of the document."

The decision to include the United States wasn’t obvious. "One of the big discussions we had internally when we started this project was whether to include the United States as part of this assessment, because one of the driving factors for us is dealing with Western media coverage. They would always say things like, ‘We’ve heard about these tests or experiments that Russia or China are doing,’ and the explanation would be wildly speculative, or, ‘Well, it’s classified, so if only you knew.’"

"We thought, okay, well, maybe we’ll just try to figure out what you can get from open-source information. As it turns out—a lot." The challenge of analyzing classified military programs through open sources has a long history in defense analysis. During the Cold War, Kremlinologists used similar techniques to understand Soviet capabilities and intentions—piecing together intelligence from parade photos, technical publications, and diplomatic statements.

"We felt it was important to include the United States as part of that conversation just because the United States has a huge effect on the space domain. If you want a holistic discussion of the current stability of the space environment, you must include all the major actors—which includes the United States, as well as U.S. allies and partners, and adversaries."

This approach allows them to contextualize threats in ways that pure threat assessments can’t. "When we write reports about China or Russia doing things, we say, ‘Okay, is this new, or is this something the U.S. has been doing for two decades? How does it relate to what they've stated publicly in terms of their policy? If we have budget information, does it tie to that?’ It really helps to get a stronger sense of where these things all lie."

The assessment covers five categories of counterspace capabilities:

1. Direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons (missiles that destroy satellites but aren't placed in orbit themselves)
2. Co-orbital weapons (satellites placed in orbit that attack targets)
3. Electronic warfare capabilities
4. Directed energy weapons (lasers, particle beams, microwaves)
5. Cyber weapons that target computer systems

Countries in the report are organized using a specific methodology. "The way we organize our report is divided mostly into two sections. One covers countries that have conducted destructive anti-satellite missile tests, and we organize them in chronological order of when those tests happened. So first, the United States in 1959. Second, Russia—or the Soviet Union—in 1963. Third, China in 2007. And then India in 2019. Then the rest of the countries in our report are listed alphabetically."

This chronology reflects the evolution of anti-satellite warfare capabilities over more than six decades. The United States conducted the world's first ASAT test on September 22, 1959, using the High Virgo missile, though the test failed due to loss of telemetry. This was followed by the successful Bold Orion test on October 13, 1959, which passed within 6.4 kilometers of Explorer VI. The Soviet Union conducted its first ASAT test on November 1, 1963, with the launch of Polyot 1, beginning a Cold War competition in space weapons that would continue for decades.

The long gap between the Soviet test and China’s 2007 demonstration reflects a relatively stable post-Cold War period. But China’s destruction of its own Fengyun-1C weather satellite marked a dramatic escalation—creating over 3,000 pieces of trackable debris, most of which still pose risks today. India’s 2019 test targeted one of its own satellites at lower altitude to minimize debris, demonstrating that anti-satellite capabilities were no longer confined to the major powers.

The report also includes what Samson calls their "stoplight chart"—a visual representation of counterspace activity. "We have all 12 countries on the X-axis, and then the Y-axis has different counterspace capabilities. We call it our stoplight chart because we have a green circle that means, as far as we know, there's nothing going on there. A yellow square means there's some work being done that we're aware of. And a red triangle means there's a lot of work."

She acknowledges the subjective nature of these assessments. "It's very subjective, but obviously, we try to be objective. Every year we have big discussions about whether something should be a yellow square or a red triangle. A lot of it just depends on the available information."

The order of countries in the chart is intentional. “One of the things you may notice if you look at the chart is that the X-axis does not have the countries listed alphabetically, and that’s done for a reason. The way we organize our report reflects this chronology of destructive testing, and then the rest of the countries are listed alphabetically."

This methodology provides deeper context and more grounded analysis. "We follow articles that are in English as much as possible, so it’s possible we’re missing things. There have been some years where we’re like, ‘We’ve got maybe two pieces to add to the North Korea section,’ because there’s just not a lot there. It doesn’t mean that they can’t or don’t want to develop these capabilities, but just in terms of what we can monitor—nuclear issues, yes, absolutely; missiles, yes; but anti-satellite capabilities, not as much, as far as we know."

In 2024, the Space Force called a Chinese satellite event “dogfighting in space.” What actually happened—and why does that label matter?

The incident that sparked international attention occurred in 2024, when the U.S. Space Force Vice Chief of Space Operations General Michael Guetlein revealed that commercial space tracking companies had observed unusual Chinese satellite behavior.

“China conducted a series of proximity operations in 2024 involving three Shiyan-24C experimental satellites and two Chinese experimental space objects, the Shijian-6 05A/B,” Samson explains, citing the Space Force’s official description. “These maneuvers were observed in low Earth orbit. It involved five small satellites—a triplet and a pair—engaging in repeated rendezvous and proximity operations, meaning close approaches to one another on and off throughout the year.”

Rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) are among the most technically demanding maneuvers in spaceflight, requiring precise orbital mechanics and careful fuel management. These techniques are essential for legitimate missions like satellite servicing, debris removal, and space station operations, but they can also be applied to potentially hostile objectives.

But Samson takes issue with how the U.S. described the event. “I understand that ‘dogfighting’ is language the Space Force has been using, but for me, it’s very frustrating for a couple of reasons. First, it’s just not accurate—even as a political science major, I know that. These satellites are maneuvering close to one another, possibly conducting operations or even docking. There are reports that Chinese satellites have docked in geostationary orbit. But it’s not Star Wars—they’re not shooting and zooming around. Space maneuvers are extremely technical and deliberate.”

The physics of spaceflight make “dogfighting” a misleading analogy. Unlike aircraft in atmospheric flight, spacecraft rely entirely on thrusters for movement, making operations slow, fuel-constrained, and highly methodical—nowhere near the rapid, reactive nature of air combat.

“I don’t think it’s helpful to use language that immediately leads people to picture the wrong scenario,” she continues. “Second, calling it dogfighting implies aggressive military intent. But the U.S. has conducted close approaches. So has Russia. I worry that we’re going to talk ourselves into a conflict that doesn’t need to happen.”

Samson is clear-eyed about China’s behavior but critical of how it’s framed. “I say this fully recognizing that China is a concern to the United States—not just in space, but on Earth as well. They’re definitely a rival, and they’re not transparent about their activities. There’s plenty to be concerned about. But when the U.S. uses this kind of rhetoric, it gives our rivals ammunition to claim that we’re not acting in good faith—and that undermines diplomacy.”

The U.S. often calls space a “warfighting domain.” How does that framing influence international diplomacy?

“One of the examples I always give is that the U.S. Space Force refers to space as a warfighting domain, and they've been pushing this language for some time over the past couple of years,” Samson notes. “Part of that is meant to unlock capabilities and to understand internally how the Space Force is supposed to function in the space environment. But it's also sending a message, right?”

The U.S. Space Force was established in 2019 as the sixth branch of the U.S. military, with the mission to “organize, train, and equip space forces in order to protect U.S. and allied interests in space.” Since its inception, the service has consistently emphasized space as a contested domain requiring military readiness and operational capability.

The problem, Samson says, is how that rhetoric is used against the United States in diplomatic forums. “We co-host a conference in Geneva for delegates of the Conference on Disarmament—they're the ones who talk about nuclear issues, space issues, and fissile material. We've had a front-row seat to these discussions over the past decade or so,” she explains. “What happens is the Russians and Chinese use that language by the United States as evidence that the U.S. is not acting in good faith—that it's creating an unstable and unpredictable environment—and that they're just trying to use space peacefully while the U.S. insists on calling it a warfighting domain.”

The Conference on Disarmament has served as the world’s primary multilateral disarmament negotiating forum since 1979, with 65 member states including all major space powers. Discussions on space security there have grown increasingly contentious in recent years, as military space capabilities and doctrines have expanded. “The reality is they are doing the exact same things the United States is,” she says, “but they’re smart enough not to call it a warfighting domain. They call it other things, like ‘a domain of military activities’ or something like that. It’s different enough that they have plausible deniability.”

That difference in language has real diplomatic consequences. “At these international discussions and multilateral forums, the U.S. needs other countries to sign on to how we view responsible behavior in space, because we are the ones most affected by irresponsible behavior,” she emphasizes. “We really need to have that internationalized, and it’s to our benefit. When the United States is portrayed as the bad actor, it makes that job even more challenging—to get other countries to sign on to our vision for how space should be a predictable, reliable environment for everyone.”

What kinds of confidence-building measures could help reduce tensions without triggering an arms race?

“We have long argued that space needs an agreement similar to the Cold War–era Incidents at Sea Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union,” Samson explains. “Back then, U.S. and Soviet naval vessels were essentially playing chicken, so they created rules for how military operators should behave at sea. We think there should be a comparable understanding for responsible behavior in space.”

Signed in 1972, the Incidents at Sea Agreement established clear protocols to prevent dangerous naval encounters. It proved remarkably durable—surviving even the tensest periods of the Cold War—and still guides U.S.–Russian naval interactions today. “Just having reliable ways to communicate—and sharing information as much as possible, even accounting for security and classification limits—would go a long way toward preventing escalation or inadvertent conflict in orbit. That’s the central point.”

Samson also stresses the need for better space situational awareness (SSA). “We need a clearer picture of what’s happening in orbit and to share that data. The good news is many Western commercial firms—and now several Indian and Australian companies—provide independent tracking. So it’s no longer just the U.S. military saying, ‘We see concerning activity’; outside actors can confirm, ‘Yes, we’re seeing it too.’ The more high-quality information we have on the space environment, the better our policies will be.”

Russia is rumored to be developing a nuclear anti-satellite weapon. What would such a device do, and how should the U.S. respond?

"Russia is working to develop some sort of nuclear warhead that they may put in orbit with the goal of using it as an anti-satellite capability," Samson explains. "The thinking is that it would be detonated—and we know what happens when nuclear warheads are detonated in space because both the U.S. and Soviet Union did that during the first five years or so of the space age."

Historical precedent exists for nuclear weapons in space. The United States conducted high-altitude nuclear tests between 1958 and 1962, including the well-known Starfish Prime test, which detonated a 1.4-megaton warhead 250 miles above the Pacific Ocean. The Soviet Union conducted similar tests, including three high-altitude nuclear detonations in 1962.

"Basically, two things happen. One, satellites that are within line of sight are going to have issues—electronics are going to get fried. But the big thing is the electromagnetic pulse that’s released when the nuclear warhead detonates. It releases a lot of radiation into the environment."

The effects would be devastating—and indiscriminate. "The excess radiation gets trapped in the Van Allen belts, which are natural radiation environments that extend down to just above the top of low Earth orbit. Satellites are built to deal with a limited amount of radiation, but as you pass through higher radiation environments more and more often, that’s going to lead to failure. What we could see is the possibility of satellites in lower orbit just becoming rocks."

The Van Allen radiation belts, discovered in 1958, are regions of charged particles held in place by Earth’s magnetic field. After the 1962 Starfish Prime test, an artificial radiation belt persisted for years and damaged multiple satellites. "There have been some open-source analyses of how long it would take for the radiation to dissipate. It depends on a lot of things—the size of the warhead, the altitude, magnetic fields. But generally speaking, maybe about a year in low Earth orbit, and maybe about a month in geostationary orbit."

Some satellites, she notes, might survive. "I don’t think it would necessarily take out the high-value, billion-dollar intelligence and reconnaissance satellites or missile warning satellites, just because those are built to operate in a nuclear environment. They’re hardened against this type of radiation. GPS satellites might be hardened as well, since GPS started as a military system, and the satellites contain nuclear detection sensors."

Indeed, GPS satellites carry sensors as part of the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System, designed to monitor nuclear explosions around the world to support treaty verification and strategic warning. When it comes to deterrence, Samson advocates a layered strategy—not just military responses. "If you’re trying to deter this sort of thing from happening, it’s helpful to communicate to Russia that this is not something you do lightly. Frankly, I think this is something they would do kind of as an end-of-days scenario—Putin’s in his bunker and he’s thinking, ‘All right, I’m taking you down with me.’ But still, I think it’s important to communicate to them that this would be an issue."

"I think it’s important to communicate to Russia’s allies and partners—countries like China and India—that they will definitely be affected. This is a very crude anti-satellite capability. You cannot control who’s going to be affected or not. If you’re in the environment, you’re going to be affected."

Other response options could include diplomatic pressure, launch interdiction, or even cyber operations. In a worst-case scenario, the U.S. could face a decision between letting the weapon launch or conducting a conventional ASAT strike. "There’s a possibility of doing left of launch efforts to prevent it from leaving the ground, or conducting a cyber attack to affect it, or trying to find some way to hamper it being launched. I think even in a worst-case scenario, if we’re trying to think about trade-offs, is it conducting an attack where you shoot down a country’s satellite—which has never happened—or having an EMP go off that’s intended to take out all the satellites in low Earth orbit? You’re kind of picking the least bad thing."

"I think there are a lot of things you could do short of actually tipping the scale and conducting an anti-satellite attack yourself. But that might be the worst option at that point." She also emphasizes deterrence by denial—designing space systems to survive attacks or resume operations quickly. "There are other ways to deter through denial, such as having backup satellites ready to go if something happens to your current ones, having a mission capability that can be performed elsewhere, having rapid launch capability, having that mission carried out maybe by very high-altitude UAVs or satellites in very low Earth orbit. There’s been increasing interest in how to operate at lower altitudes."

The idea behind deterrence by denial is simple: make it harder for an adversary to achieve their objective, thus reducing the appeal of the attack itself. She also sees diplomacy as a critical element of U.S. national security strategy. "One of the things I’ve long argued is that diplomacy can be a very effective national security tool. We have these discussions at the United Nations where they’re talking about responsible behavior, and I think that’s a time to have these conversations—to really send messaging and get other countries on board with our approach to these issues."

The Golden Dome missile-defense plan proposes space-based interceptors. What are the biggest technical and strategic pitfalls?

"It’s a big project, but for space specifically, there’s the idea of having an interceptor layer—space-based interceptors in low Earth orbit that would be up there to intercept ICBMs during their boost phase," Samson explains. "The boost phase is a very short time span—depending on whether it's a liquid or solid fuel missile, we're talking about two to three minutes. The decision time is going to be even shorter—maybe less than a minute, perhaps 30 seconds or so."

The concept of space-based interceptors isn’t new. During the 1980s, President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative proposed a similar system, including a component known as “Brilliant Pebbles”—a constellation of small interceptor satellites designed to destroy incoming missiles from orbit.

When asked about Ambassador Hank Cooper’s argument that Golden Dome is being mischaracterized as a “Manhattan Project”—despite SDI-era calculations showing the concept could be achieved more affordably—Samson acknowledges the competing views on cost. "I would say there have been a lot more recent calculations that suggest it could cost $540 billion. That’s a lot of money. It’s not cheap the way some proponents would have you believe."

The technical hurdles are enormous. "How do you determine, when you see a launch, whether it's a satellite or an ICBM? You’re working with a very limited window. Can you realistically have a person in the loop for that kind of decision? If you’re talking about 30 seconds, it has to be automated. I honestly don’t see how this works, technically. I worry we may end up making bad choices simply because decisions have to be made so quickly."

This problem—distinguishing peaceful satellite launches from hostile missile launches—has challenged missile defense planners for decades. North Korea’s satellite launches, for example, use technology nearly identical to long-range ballistic missiles, making the distinction even more difficult in practice.

And beyond feasibility, Samson raises strategic concerns. "If you look at the executive order, the system is supposed to protect the homeland against ICBMs, cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and—after the Ukraine war—even UAVs. It’s going to rely on sensors, and then this proposed space-based interceptor layer."

She notes that current U.S. missile defense systems already have notable limitations. "The U.S. is working on what’s essentially a system-of-systems approach. There’s the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, intended to defend the continental U.S. and Alaska from ICBMs during their midcourse phase. Then you have systems like Patriot for regional defense against short- and medium-range missiles, and THAAD for defense against missiles up to intermediate-range during their terminal phases. And you’ve got Aegis, a ship-based system for short- and intermediate-range ballistic missile defense."

And the U.S. already has demonstrated anti-satellite capability with these systems. "In 2008, the U.S. conducted an anti-satellite test using a ship-based missile defense interceptor. They said all they had to do was modify some of the software and a little bit of the hardware." But the broader track record is concerning. "The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system hasn’t performed particularly well in testing. Even in controlled conditions, it’s had only about a 50% success rate. And the dirty secret is that cruise missile defense is even harder—especially at the continental level. Cruise missiles are incredibly difficult to track because they don’t follow predictable, ballistic trajectories."

"We tend to rely very heavily on what we wish missile defense could do rather than what it actually can do," she warns. "I worry that we’ll say, ‘Look, we’ve got interceptors in orbit, we’re fine, we’re protected,’ and then take provocative steps under that false sense of security—when in reality, we’re not covered."

Even more troubling are the arms race dynamics. "You throw enough missiles at any defense system, and something’s going to get through. This just creates incentives for adversaries to build more offensive missiles. That’s exactly why the U.S. and the Soviet Union imposed limits on missile defense during the Cold War—to avoid encouraging massive nuclear buildups."

And there’s a paradox: while Golden Dome may be ineffective as missile defense, it could work too well as an anti-satellite weapon. "What I’d argue is that while it’s technically very weak as a missile defense layer, it’s actually a pretty effective anti-satellite capability. Space-based interceptors can point up as well as down. So are we opening that Pandora’s box—making it acceptable to deploy space-based interceptors? Because we’re the ones with the most to lose in that scenario."

The current satellite landscape underscores that imbalance. "There are around 12,400 active satellites right now. Of those, about 8,900 are American. China has about 1,000, and Russia has roughly 300. That’s a massive difference. So do we really want to give other countries a reason to develop capabilities that can target satellites? Because we’d be the most vulnerable."

Samson believes the actual implementation will likely be far more limited than the public framing implies. "My prediction is that they’ll just continue forward with all the existing missile defense programs. The only ‘new’ element will be whatever they do about the space-based interceptor layer. I think they’ll put up some kind of test satellite—maybe not the interceptor itself, but some host infrastructure, like what they talked about back in the ’80s with the Space-Based Interceptor program—and say, ‘This is a proof of concept. This is the technology needed for the Golden Dome.’ Then they’ll check the box and say, ‘We met President Trump’s requirement.’"

Commercial space companies like SpaceX's Starlink are increasingly integrated with military operations. How do you protect civilian infrastructure when it has dual-use capabilities?

“It’s a very good question, and I don’t have a great answer. No one has a great answer,” Samson admits. The challenge of dual-use space infrastructure has grown exponentially with commercialization. SpaceX’s Starlink constellation now numbers more than 7,000 satellites, providing global internet coverage—and serving as a critical communications link for Ukrainian forces fighting Russia’s invasion.

The Pentagon has issued commercial-integration strategies to address this tension. “Both the Defense Department and the Space Force released commercial-integration strategies last spring that cover how to incorporate commercial capabilities and even address indemnification—essentially, how to compensate companies if they’re targeted because their services are used in a military context.”

NATO is moving in the same direction. "NATO is actually having its annual meeting this coming week, and they're supposed to release a commercial-integration strategy as well. I'm very curious to see what it says." (NATO subsequently released its first Commercial Space Strategy in February 2025, which aims to strengthen the Alliance's relationship with commercial space partners and improve its ability to leverage commercial space services for operational and defence planning requirements). Once a commercial system is used for military purposes, Samson notes, "you are a lawful target. The laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law apply in space just as they do on Earth. You still have to meet the tests of proportionality, distinction, and military necessity, and use the least force possible—but you remain a legitimate target."

That legal framework is largely untested in space, especially for dual-use commercial satellites. Starlink highlights the complexity. “It provides satellite internet that both sides of a conflict can use—Ukraine and Russia. If you turn it off so the Russians can’t access it, how do you avoid harming Ukrainian forces or even U.S. personnel?” SpaceX has grappled with this dilemma in Ukraine, at times restricting service in specific areas to prevent offensive operations.

Russia and China have publicly warned Western companies about “interfering in domestic affairs,” effectively signaling that dual-use satellites could become targets. “Realistically, I don’t think they’ll physically attack Starlink satellites—there are more than 7,000 of them. Knocking out one or two wouldn’t matter. They could pursue cyberattacks, but SpaceX keeps upgrading satellites, so that’s no easy task either.”

Chinese military writings, she says, view Starlink quite differently. “They treat Starlink as if it’s an arm of the U.S. government—part of American military space capability. One PLA-linked report this year even claimed Starlink satellites have robotic arms, jammers, directed-energy weapons, and the ability to release projectiles. I don’t think that’s accurate, but if they believe it, they might build systems to counter it.”

The looming surge of large commercial constellations further complicates matters. “Many actors want their own very large constellations. Look at ITU filings—hundreds of thousands of satellites are planned. Some are already launching. Amazon’s Project Kuiper has its first prototypes in orbit. China now has two constellations coming online—one state-owned, one quasi-commercial—with about 100 satellites up so far and ambitions to match Starlink’s scale.”

That proliferation could create brand-new friction points. “Imagine a massive Chinese constellation operating in the same orbital shells as Starlink: thousands of satellites making close approaches. What’s the agreed-upon ‘right of way’? How do operators define responsible behavior? Is there an emergency phone number that won’t just sit in an inbox over the weekend?”

She doesn’t mince words about the stakes. “This could become a flashpoint between nuclear-armed rivals. That is not a stable situation.”

Iran is developing space capabilities with Russian assistance, including plans for the Chabahar Spaceport. With ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, how can we distinguish between legitimate space activities and potential weapons development?

“Russia has had a nuclear program since 1949, so they have the expertise. They’ve already miniaturized nuclear warheads to fit on ICBMs. That’s not something a country with a very new, nascent nuclear program could easily do—shrinking a warhead small enough to fit on a satellite,” Samson explains.

Iran’s space program, which began in the early 2000s, is still young compared with those of established space powers. The country struggles with launch reliability and lacks the sophisticated engineering experience required to miniaturize nuclear warheads for orbital deployment.

“We included North Korea and Iran when we expanded our original six countries because those are the programs Americans worry about,” she says. “Neither North Korea nor Iran talks much about developing counterspace capabilities. Every country has the right to peaceful use of outer space, but the concern is: if I’m developing a space-launch vehicle, it could also serve as an ICBM. That’s why their launch programs raise alarms.”

Dual-use launch technology has been a concern since the dawn of the space age. The same rockets that loft satellites can, in principle, deliver warheads across continents—although the guidance and re-entry technologies for ICBMs are far more demanding. “There’s not much evidence of Iranian or North Korean counterspace work—at least publicly. Some might say, ‘Well, they’re just not talking about it,’ but they definitely have no problem boasting about their nuclear programs, so it’s a challenge to hide.”

Collaboration among these states is another factor, Samson notes. Russian-Iranian cooperation has also accelerated. “Russia’s been working more with Iran in recent years. They’ve launched a couple of Iranian satellites. Iran has a civil space agency, and the IRGC—the Revolutionary Guard Corps—runs a separate military launch program.”

For years, Iran’s civilian agency struggled to reach orbit, while the IRGC achieved more consistent results only recently. “Each year, when we update our report, we check: did Iran launch the satellites it promised? They often schedule launches for their New Year in March. Many slip to the next year—and then the next. Deadlines keep moving.”

Such delays reflect sanctions, technical hurdles, and limited resources. The planned Chabahar Spaceport underscores Iran’s ambitions but also its limitations. “That base is in early development. They’re looking at the early 2030s for operations—quite a way off,” Samson says.

North Korea, meanwhile, has achieved modest milestones. “They launched a satellite within the past year, and it performed some orbit-raising maneuvers. That shows basic control, which is notable—but it’s nowhere near being able to ram another satellite.”

She stresses the difference between basic satellite operations and weaponization. “People sometimes assume any satellite can be a weapon. In reality, targeting another satellite requires advanced capabilities: precise maneuvering, changing orbits and speed, matching a target, performing rendezvous and proximity operations. Iran and North Korea haven’t demonstrated anything close to that.”

“If you’re building a satellite for active debris removal, on-orbit servicing, or RPO, then you’re heading toward potential counterspace capability,” she adds. “But again, Iran and North Korea are far from that.” Ultimately, she reiterates, “They’re allowed to develop space-launch capabilities. The question is what they intend to do with them.”

Looking ahead, what are your top three concerns for space security in the near term?

“First, we need to sort out military rendezvous and proximity operations—how we share information and agree on best practices,” Samson emphasizes. “In UN forums, there have been serious discussions about responsible behavior. Most countries agree that unannounced close approaches to other nations’ satellites should be frowned upon.”

The UN has worked on guidelines for responsible behavior through various forums, though COPUOS doesn't address military activities—those discussions happen strictly at the Conference on Disarmament. While there have been discussions about what constitutes responsible behavior, consensus remains elusive on defining what that actually means.

“I can’t see the U.S. giving up this capability,” Samson adds, “but we need a clear understanding of what activities are planned and a way to alert other operators—or at least a reliable channel to raise concerns if your satellite is being approached.”

Second is the growing threat of electronic warfare against satellite systems. “Jamming and spoofing of GPS and other positioning, navigation, and timing signals pose real safety risks for civil aviation. The radio spectrum doesn’t respect borders; interference bleeds far beyond active conflict zones. It’s become so widespread that some airports have had to suspend certain GPS-based approaches.”

GPS jamming incidents have surged across Europe, the Middle East, and other regions, forcing airlines to fall back on older navigation methods. “Pilots report their cockpit clocks literally start running backward—one way they know they’re under GPS attack. Almost anyone can do it now, which makes it a pervasive safety issue as well as a security problem.”

Yet the U.S. has been slow to field stronger GPS signals. “GPS was designed long ago, when jamming wasn’t a concern, so the signal is weak. The newer GPS III satellites broadcast a tougher-to-jam signal, but the ground segment—called OCX—has slipped badly. If we’re serious about countering jamming, getting OCX fully operational should be a priority.” The OCX program has faced cost overruns and delays since 2010, leaving the upgraded satellites under-utilized.

Third—and more long-term—is competition over lunar resources. “People ask about a space arms race; I don’t see that. What I do see is a race to the Moon. The U.S. aims to return soon, China and Russia want permanent footholds, and depending on how Starship or other issues go, the U.S. may be only a couple of years ahead—if that.”

NASA’s Artemis program targets a crewed landing by the mid-2020s; China plans one by 2030 and has partnered with Russia for lunar exploration. “The U.S., China, and India have all published preferred landing zones—mainly near the lunar South Pole, where permanently shadowed craters may contain water ice. Those locations overlap, so competing claims are inevitable.”

Water ice could support long-term human presence and fuel production, making the south-polar region a strategic prize. “My concern is rival nations chasing prestige could trip into conflict. I’m not imagining sabotage like in the TV show Space Force, but multiple crews vying for the same spots is a recipe for tension.”

The U.S.-led Artemis Accords propose “safety zones” around lunar activities. “Lunar dust kicked up by landers can damage equipment kilometers away. Without agreed protocols and good communication, a routine landing could spark accusations of interference.

What's your overall assessment of where space security stands today?

 “We’re in the most complex and challenging strategic environment we’ve seen in a long time—if not ever,” Samson reflects. Yet the greatest hurdle is not technical; it’s communicational. “So much of this comes down to showing good intent. How do you share information that de-escalates? If you need to send a message, how do you make sure it escalates only as far as you intend? Russians and Chinese think about escalation differently. The U.S. sees it as a ladder you climb only upward, but they treat it like a dial you can turn back down. You can imagine how that leads to tricky situations.”

These contrasting views stem from deeper cultural and strategic differences. U.S. doctrine often treats escalation as a series of rungs, while Russian and Chinese strategy emphasizes “dial-up, dial-down” flexibility—what some analysts call “escalate to de-escalate.”

“Miscommunication—and the absence of communication—causes most conflicts,” Samson stresses. “We don’t have to agree, but we do need to talk about how we interpret each other’s actions and what we’re planning to do. We’re dealing with potential flashpoints between nuclear-armed rivals. That’s inherently unstable.”

In a world where satellites underpin everything from GPS navigation to global communications, Samson’s warning is stark: the greatest threat may not be the weapons themselves but the rhetoric surrounding them.

Author's Analysis

Victoria Samson offers a uniquely clear-eyed lens on orbital security because she never set out to be a “space person.” A foreign-policy graduate who once found satellites “boring,” she nonetheless spent the past eight years working with other SWF colleagues on building Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace Threat Assessment into the gold-standard open-source catalogue of military space capabilities. That outsider’s trajectory matters: it lets her fuse rigorous technical detail with the diplomatic instincts of an international-relations analyst, turning raw launch data and budget lines into a coherent narrative about deterrence and stability. In an era of proliferating secrecy, her insistence that “enormous amounts of useful intelligence can be gleaned from public sources” not only democratizes space situational awareness but also supplies a common evidentiary floor for negotiations that otherwise descend into dueling accusations.

What most distinguishes Samson’s analysis is her warning that words can be more destabilizing than weapons. She argues that U.S. officials, by branding space a “warfighting domain” and Chinese proximity maneuvers as “dogfighting,” gift adversaries a diplomatic cudgel: if Washington talks like combat is inevitable, Moscow and Beijing can cast every American proposal for norms as cynical or hypocritical. Because the United States operates roughly three-quarters of all active satellites, this rhetorical escalation endangers the actor with the most to lose—us—while strengthening hard-liners who thrive on grievance narratives. Samson’s prescription is not naïve optimism; it is disciplined messaging: pair credible defenses with language that reassures partners and denies rivals the chance to define America as the spoiler. 

Her critique of President Trump’s “Golden Dome” plan underscores that discipline. The concept of a space-based boost-phase interceptor layer, she notes, demands split-second autonomous kill decisions, confronts serious technical hurdles, and carries a half-trillion-dollar price tag. Yet its greatest flaw is strategic, not engineering: while unlikely to stop a mass missile raid, the same constellation would be an exceedingly capable anti-satellite weapon pointing at the orbital economy the United States depends on. By normalizing putting weapons in space to target satellites , Washington could spur rivals to do the same, eroding the very security margin it seeks. 

Looking ahead, Samson ranks three issues as the space community’s most urgent stress tests: unannounced rendezvous-and-proximity operations that blur the line between servicing and stalking; electronic warfare that turns civilian GPS dependence into a battlefield vulnerability; and the looming scramble for lunar resources, where overlapping South-Pole landing zones and dust plumes could spark terrestrial-level disputes in the silence of the Moon. Each challenge scales in time horizon—from “right now” spectrum jamming to decade-long lunar footholds—but all share a single remedy: transparency coupled with credible but proportionate deterrence. Her balance of cautious optimism and hard-nosed realism reminds policymakers that preventing conflict is still cheaper than cleaning up orbital debris fields or salvaging burned diplomacy. In the end, Samson’s core message is disarmingly simple: communicate early, measure words as carefully as thrust vectors, and build security architectures that do not invite the very arms race they were designed to forestall.

About Victoria Samson

Victoria Samson is the Chief Director, Space Security and Stability for Secure World Foundation and has over twenty-five years of experience in military space and security issues.

Before joining SWF, Ms. Samson served as a Senior Analyst for the Center for Defense Information (CDI), where she leveraged her expertise in missile defense, nuclear reductions, and space security issues to conduct in-depth analysis and media commentary. Prior to her time at CDI, Ms. Samson was the Senior Policy Associate at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of arms control groups in the Washington, D.C. area, where she worked on issues related to ballistic missile defense and nuclear weapons reduction. Before that, she was a researcher at Riverside Research Institute, where she worked on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.

She is the chair of the International Astronautical Federation (IAF)'s Security Task Force and a member of the Space Security Working Group of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM)’s Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC).

Ms. Samson holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree in political science with a specialization in international relations from UCLA and a Master of Arts (M.A.) in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Additional Resources

Global Counterspace Threat Assessment - Secure World Foundation's comprehensive analysis of counterspace capabilities across twelve nations, including the stoplight chart visualization of capability maturity levels.

Russia's Alleged Nuclear ASAT FAQ - Analysis of open-source information regarding Russia's potential development of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon.

Space Security Portal - Interactive map providing profiles of space security-related policies for UN Member States, intergovernmental organizations, and multistakeholder initiatives.