"The Unprotected Power Grid Will Be Our Civilization's Death Warrant If We Don't Act": Doug Ellsworth, Co-Director of the Secure the Grid Coalition, on America's Most Urgent National Security Threat

On March 13, 1989, an invisible storm slammed into Earth's magnetic field. Within 92 seconds, Quebec's power grid collapsed, plunging six million people into darkness. Transformers melted. Power surged and arced across the northeastern United States. The aurora borealis, normally visible only near the poles, blazed in the night sky as far south as Cuba.

This was not an attack by a foreign power. It was a geomagnetic disturbance—a solar storm. And it was relatively minor compared to what could come.

In 1859, a solar event known as the "Carrington Event" struck Earth with roughly ten times the intensity. Telegraph systems burst into flames. Operators received electric shocks. Had our modern electrical grid existed then, the damage would have been catastrophic on a scale few can comprehend.

"People assume the Carrington Event was the biggest one that ever hit Earth," Douglas Ellsworth tells me, his voice carrying the controlled urgency of someone who understands an existential threat that most ignore. "The fallacy there is that we have no idea what is to come."

Ellsworth is no doomsday prophet. He's a seasoned professional who spent decades in finance and security before becoming Co-Director of the Secure the Grid Coalition. Now, he's one of America's foremost advocates for protecting our electrical infrastructure against threats from space—both natural and man-made. And what keeps him up at night is the chilling reality that our modern civilization hangs by the thinnest of threads: a vulnerable electrical grid with critical components that could take years to replace if damaged.

Tell me about your background and how you became involved with the Secure the Grid Coalition. What drove your interest in grid security issues?

Ellsworth begins by describing his circuitous career path that ultimately led him to grid security advocacy. "I backed into this field much like I've done with everything in my career," he explains with a subtle smile. "My professional path has never been linear." His career began in finance in 1974, working with exchange-traded stock options before shifting to value-oriented investment strategies influenced by Benjamin Graham. By the 1990s, he had transitioned to business leadership, eventually owning Secure Communications Corporation, which developed network security systems used by federal agencies.

"September 11th fundamentally changed my professional direction," he continues. "I reconnected with colleagues in Omaha who worked in defense-related industries, and together we formed an educational organization called USAPACT."

Through this work, Ellsworth developed an interest in electromagnetic pulse threats, briefing a  CERT conference on EMP issues in 2006. His networking eventually connected him with Tommy Waller at the Center for Security Policy, who invited him to become a member of the Secure the Grid Coalition. When Waller needed someone to step in temporarily, Ellsworth was selected.

"Tommy invited me to join the Secure the Grid Coalition about ten years ago, which I hadn't even known existed before then," he recalls. "About five years ago, when Tommy needed to return to his Marine Corps reserve duties, he asked if I could fill in as director for possibly six months. That interim role stretched to nine months, and I've remained deeply involved ever since."

What strikes me most about Ellsworth's story is the outrage that fuels his advocacy—outrage at discovering that those most capable of protecting critical infrastructure weren't taking the threats seriously.

"What captured my outrage," he says, "was realizing that the very people most capable of protecting the assets that generate their revenues weren't eager to do so. You would expect them to be proactive in safeguarding and perpetuating that success—but they're not."

When I ask why utility companies seem reluctant to address these vulnerabilities, Ellsworth offers insight into the industry mindset.

"There are a lot of moving parts behind the resistance. Some industry leaders don’t even fully understand how the grid operates beyond their own little fiefdoms. Their focus is on immediate, day-to-day challenges—every moment presents a new problem to solve. So when it comes to thinking long-term about broader vulnerabilities, they just don’t want to look at it."

Given your experience with the Secure the Grid Coalition, what are the most pressing vulnerabilities you see in the U.S. electric grid from space-based threats such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) and high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) attacks?

As we turn to the technical vulnerabilities of the U.S. electric grid, Ellsworth's demeanor shifts. He speaks with a palpable sense of urgency about the extreme fragility of our nation's power infrastructure.

"The single greatest vulnerability lies in the loss of large power transformers," he explains. "Under the best circumstances today, it takes three to five years to replace just one, depending on its size."

He paints a stark and sobering picture of what would happen if multiple transformers were damaged at once:

"What happens if the world suddenly needs a thousand of them? Or even 200? Even needing just ten would be difficult. And if we need the right ten—critical ones—we could be in the dark for a very long time. We simply can’t survive without electricity for that long. That’s why the EMP Commission staff warned that up to 90% of the American population could die following a catastrophic grid failure. Maybe that number sounds extreme—maybe it scares people so much they dismiss it. But even if you assume a 10% loss, that's still 30 million lives. Is that acceptable? Of course not."

What stands out most is Ellsworth’s broader concern that vulnerabilities extend beyond natural or accidental threats—into the realm of foreign interference.

"There’s a documented case where a 500,000-pound transformer manufactured by China’s Jiangsu Huapeng Transformer Company was seized by federal authorities and sent to Sandia National Laboratories for inspection," he recounts. "Though many details remain classified, it was revealed that the transformer contained hardware that could have allowed someone in China to remotely disable it."

The growing dependence on foreign-manufactured transformers is deeply troubling to Ellsworth. By  February 2025, U.S. imports of large power transformers from China had surged to 554 units exceeding 10 MVA, including  436 units exceeding 100 MVA—the class of transformers most critical to the reliable operation of the grid.

Can you elaborate on the current standards for solar storm and EMP protection of the grid, and why you believe they are "transparently defective and dangerously ineffective"? What specific improvements do you advocate for?

On the subject of regulatory standards, Ellsworth’s frustration becomes evident. He describes a system riddled with conflicts of interest and dangerously inadequate protections.

"Our current standards are mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)," he explains. "FERC was assigned this authority after the Great Northeastern Blackout, which was caused by a tree branch contacting a high-power line. In response, Congress gave FERC the additional responsibility of naming an Electric Reliability Organization—or ERO—to draft reliability rules."

However, the flaw, Ellsworth says, lies in who FERC selected. "They chose a pre-existing trade association—the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)—to serve as the ERO. NERC was already working on behalf of industry interests and continues to do so today. Even now, around 80% of their board of governors are from utility companies. It took nearly a decade for them to produce a regulation that simply mandated better tree trimming. That's hardly a serious response to systemic grid vulnerabilities."

Ellsworth pulls out visual aids to demonstrate the inadequacy of current standards, showing me a graph comparing the current GMD protection standard with real-world data.

"The current GMD protection standard uses a benchmark of 8 V/km. After applying a 'scaling factor' for regions like Virginia and Washington, D.C., the actual protection level drops to just 2 V/km. Now compare that to real-world events like the March 1989 Solar Storm, where measured field amplitudes hit 21.66 V/km in Maine, 19.02 V/km in Virginia, and 17.33 V/km in Connecticut. The gap between the standard and reality is staggering."

When asked what the protection standard should be, Ellsworth is direct: "The Congressional EMP Commission recommended protecting the grid to withstand events up to 85 V/km, covering both severe solar storms and HEMP E3 pulses. We fully concur with that recommendation."

But Ellsworth doesn’t stop at just advocating for better numbers on paper. He passionately champions the need for real-world solutions that have already proven effective. "Proven technology exists to guard against ground-induced currents—specifically, Neutral Blocking Devices (NBDs). One such system, 'SolidGround' by Emprimus, LLC, has been field-tested and validated in live-grid operations across multiple locations."

Simplified Simulink block‑diagram for a 230 kV transmission‑line model, showing the computation of the K₀ series constant (magnitude = 0.768, angle ≈ −1.54°) for various line lengths.

Ellsworth notes that three major utilities—American Transmission Company (since 2015), Western Area Power Administration (since 2022), and the Tennessee Valley Authority—have all implemented SolidGround systems. "What’s especially remarkable," he adds, "is that during actual solar events, SolidGround systems detected and neutralized dangerous ground-induced currents before NOAA or the Space Weather Prediction Center even realized an event was underway." For Ellsworth, it’s not just about identifying risks—it’s about applying available, proven solutions before disaster strikes.

The Secure the Grid Coalition has advocated for a "golden dome" approach to grid protection. What would such a system look like in practice, and what are the key barriers to its implementation?

When discussing the Secure the Grid Coalition's vision for comprehensive grid protection, Ellsworth speaks with admiration for former Strategic Defense Initiative director Ambassador Henry Cooper and his bold "golden dome" concept.

"Ambassador Cooper's 'golden dome' envisions multiple, overlapping layers of protection," Ellsworth explains. "It would include ground-based protection for our transformers, enhanced physical security for substations, and a space-based missile defense system modeled on the 'Brilliant Pebbles' concept—an idea that was validated but never fully deployed."

When I ask about obstacles to implementation, Ellsworth sighs deeply. "The biggest problem is that no one is actually in charge of making this happen," he says. "The Department of Defense thinks it's the Department of Homeland Security's responsibility. DHS says, 'Oh, well, the sector-specific agency for energy is the Department of Energy.' DOE, in turn, claims, 'We've got it handled through FERC.' It's an endless game of finger-pointing."

"What makes this even worse," Ellsworth continues, "is that the electricity/utility complex insists that defending the nation from attacks is not their responsibility and redirects responsibility back to the DoD. This endless loop leaves no entity clearly accountable, creating a dangerous gap in the protection of critical infrastructure. Utilities, despite operating the grid, argue that national defense falls outside their purview, yet they benefit from the stability and public trust that a secure grid provides. This lack of ownership undermines efforts to safeguard the grid against physical and cyber threats, leaving everyone in our society exposed to potential catastrophe."

Beyond bureaucratic paralysis, Ellsworth highlights an even deeper systemic problem: regulatory capture. "Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory body ends up doing the bidding of the industry it's supposed to oversee," he explains. "And what happens after that? Well, they've usually got a lucrative job waiting for them in the private sector. They become what's known as revolving door lobbyists—former commissioners who can command premium salaries because of their insider knowledge and connections."

In Ellsworth's view, these structural dysfunctions—confused lines of responsibility, endless studies without action, and cozy relationships between regulators and industry—pose some of the greatest threats to the future security of the American electric grid.

How do you assess the risk of adversaries using space-based or high-altitude nuclear devices to generate EMPs against the U.S., and how prepared are our infrastructures to respond to such an event?

On the topic of adversarial threats and space-based EMP attacks, Ellsworth adopts a measured, analytical tone, taking care to distinguish between different types of threat actors. "An attack against the United States would only happen once—there’s no repeat frequency to calculate," he explains. "That’s why the correct framework isn’t risk assessment but threat assessment. The leaders of these criminal nations live very privileged, indulgent lives. Going to war risks everything they have."

However, Ellsworth expresses particular concern about rogue states with less to lose."What truly worries me are Iran and North Korea," he says. "It's been suggested that their leaders fear winding up in the dustbin of history. If that day comes—when the populace is at their gates with pitchforks and torches, and they know they face a brutal end—there’s a real danger that, in desperation, they might lash out. They may push the buttons without caring who they hit. It's the potential for irrational action that alarms me the most."

I'm surprised when Ellsworth mentions a vulnerability I hadn't considered before. "The balloon that recently traversed the United States demonstrated that stealth delivery is possible. Balloons can reach altitudes sufficient to carry payloads capable of generating an EMP—and they're much harder to detect than missiles."

He also points out gaps in our defensive posture. "All of our radar fans are pointed north and west—to protect against bombardments from Russia and China. But the southern Gulf is wide open. There are no radar fans covering that approach. During the Cold War, the Soviets developed the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), specifically to exploit this vulnerability—launching southward to circle around and attack through our undefended Gulf. The frightening thing is, that gap still exists today."

Ellsworth’s assessment underscores an unsettling reality: while traditional threats may seem manageable through deterrence, the risk of rogue state actions, stealth delivery methods, and longstanding gaps in early-warning systems create dangerous vulnerabilities that remain largely unaddressed.

What role should public awareness, grassroots activism, and cross-sector collaboration play in advancing grid defense initiatives, and how can organizations like the Secure the Grid Coalition mobilize broader support for these critical issues?

As our conversation draws to a close, Ellsworth emphasizes the pivotal role of local action, public engagement, and cross-sector collaboration in advancing grid defense initiatives.

"This is where grassroots activism becomes crucial," he explains. "The formation of more local groups creates the perception of size—and that perception is powerful. It transforms isolated efforts into a true movement."

Ellsworth speaks with admiration about Waldo County, Maine, holding it up as a model for how local communities can build genuine resilience against prolonged power outages.

"The Waldo County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) has constructed an Off-Grid Emergency Operations Center, designed specifically to withstand and outlast long-term blackouts," he says. "They've installed multiple redundant power systems—solar panels with battery storage, propane generators, and even a wood-fired cook stove for heating. They've integrated amateur radio operators, set up emergency food distribution systems, and forged relationships with local fuel suppliers. It's a comprehensive approach."

I ask Ellsworth about the role of emergency managers in this grassroots effort. "Emergency managers are the ideal audience for grassroots groups. But one challenge is that too many are unwilling to lead by example. I often ask emergency managers, 'Are you personally prepared at home?' Unfortunately, far too many are not. I don't consider myself a 'doomsday prepper,' but I firmly believe: you can't preach preparedness if you haven't practiced it yourself."

Ellsworth also reflects on the changing landscape of electrical power delivery and how it might impact future resilience:

"In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, electricity was generated and consumed locally, with small-scale power plants serving nearby communities. This model, akin to thousands of small bowls of liquid being filled and drained independently, struggled to balance supply with unpredictable demand. In the 1920s, the development of high-voltage transmission lines created a nationwide 'backbone' that consolidated generation sources into a single, larger 'bowl.' This interconnected grid achieved two key goals: it extended electricity access to rural Americans, and it simplified the challenge of balancing supply and demand by creating a larger, more forgiving system that sort of regresses toward a predictable norm. Distribution circuits siphoned power from this nationwide backbone to meet instantaneous demand, enabling a scalable and efficient system that brilliantly powered Our Nation's growth – THEN."

"Today however," he continues, "the centralized grid model is being challenged by a return to localized power generation, driven by the need for reliability, control, and resilience and protection. The CISA-Resilient Power Working Group has highlighted self-generation as the future for meeting primary power needs, particularly for large consumers like industrial plants, refineries, and data centers. Military installations are leading this shift, adopting self-generation to ensure uninterrupted power for critical operations. The benefits—cost savings, enhanced reliability, and greater control—will soon compel civilian large-scale consumers to follow suit. By generating their own power, these entities reduce dependence on the legacy grid, bypassing existing and unprotected vulnerabilities in the centralized system, while at the same time, gaining autonomy over their energy needs."

This transition carries significant implications for utility companies. "What this means is an existential threat to incumbent utilities' revenues and profits. Their largest and most predictable customers, those factories, refineries, and datacenters will transition to self-generation, utilities will be left serving small businesses, some medium-scale enterprises, and residential customers, which are the least predictable in their demand schedules. What's more, utilities' historical failure to invest adequately in protective measures against physical and cyber threats has eroded public trust. As outages become more common and the fecklessness of utilities toward protecting society in a forthright manner becomes more widely known, the goodwill of the American public will shift to local and more ruggedized alternatives to meet their energy needs."

Our conversation ends on a pragmatic note, with Ellsworth emphasizing that while the challenges are significant, solutions exist. "The nationwide cost to protect America from harmful ground-induced currents (GICs) was estimated at just over $4 billion—that's about one-third of one percent of the total cost of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. Yet even after the Inflation Reduction Act made billions more available, we have not seen the Department of Energy prioritize GIC protection for the grid."

As we wrap up, Ellsworth leaves me with a final, sobering reflection—one that underlines the inevitability of the threat: "Even if we succeed in deterring adversaries from launching an EMP attack, there's a 100% certainty that Earth will be struck by a large solar storm someday. We just don't know when. If we fail to protect our transformers from GICs, we are virtually guaranteeing a devastating, long-term blackout in the future."

Author's Analysis

Ellsworth's warnings about grid vulnerability represent a critical national security briefing that transcends typical partisan divides. Several key observations emerge from our conversation:

First, the threat vectors to our electric grid are diverse and well-documented. Solar weather events like the 1989 Quebec blackout and the 1859 Carrington Event establish historical precedent. Physical attacks on substations in California (Metcalf, 2013) and North Carolina (Moore County, 2022) demonstrate ongoing vulnerabilities. The documented case of a Chinese transformer containing remote-shutdown hardware components reveals cyber-infiltration capabilities embedded in critical hardware.

Second, the necessary protective solutions already exist and have been field-validated. The SolidGround Neutral Blocking Device technology has been successfully operating in three major utility environments—American Transmission Company (since 2015), Western Area Power Administration (since 2022), and Tennessee Valley Authority. During actual solar events, these systems have proven more responsive than federal space weather monitoring agencies.

Third, the economic case for implementation is compelling. The $4 billion estimate to protect America's entire grid from ground-induced currents represents just 0.33% of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law funding. For context, a single day of nationwide blackout would cost the U.S. economy approximately $38 billion. Studies from Lockheed Martin, Zurich Services Corporation, and NOAA indicate that even non-catastrophic geomagnetic activity already costs the general U.S. economy approximately $10 billion annually.

Fourth, the governance architecture around grid security reveals systematic failures. The regulatory capture Ellsworth describes—where the North American Electric Reliability Corporation operates as both an industry trade association and its own regulator—creates inherent conflicts of interest. The "revolving door" between regulatory positions and industry lobbyists undermines independent oversight. Jurisdictional confusion between DOD, DHS, DOE, and FERC creates accountability gaps where critical protection measures fall through bureaucratic cracks.

Fifth, models for effective resilience already exist at local levels. Waldo County, Maine has constructed an Off-Grid Emergency Operations Center incorporating multiple redundant power systems, integrated communications capabilities across various frequencies, and comprehensive emergency logistics planning. This approach demonstrates that preparedness doesn't require exotic technology—it requires political will and modest investment.

The most concerning aspect of Ellsworth's testimony isn't the technical challenge of protection—it's the governance challenge. The technologies to mitigate these threats are mature, cost-effective, and commercially available. The scientific consensus on the threat is well-established across multiple federal studies spanning decades. What's missing is the institutional capability to translate this knowledge into action before a catastrophic event forces the issue at incalculable human cost.

As we consider Ellsworth's warnings, several questions demand our attention: How do we break the cycle of regulatory capture that prioritizes industry convenience over national security? What would it take to consolidate responsibility for grid protection under a single accountable authority? If local communities like Waldo County can achieve meaningful resilience with modest resources, what prevents scaling these approaches nationally? And perhaps most fundamentally: in a nation with unparalleled technological and financial resources, what explains our persistent failure to address a threat that could, in Ellsworth's words, become "our civilization's death certificate"?

Richard Feynman, reflecting on the 1986 Challenger disaster, offered wisdom that resonates with our current grid security crisis: "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled." Solar storms will come. Physics cannot be negotiated with. The question is whether we will heed Ellsworth's warnings before Nature delivers its inevitable lesson.

About Douglas Ellsworth

Douglas Ellsworth serves as a Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Policy and Co-Director of the Center-sponsored Secure the Grid (STG) Coalition—an ad hoc group of policy, energy, and national security experts, legislators, and industry insiders dedicated to strengthening the resilience of America's electrical grid.

The Secure-the-Grid Coalition and its parent, the Center for Security Policy will never endorse any vendor’s or manufacturer’s offerings in return for monies or anything of other value as compensation or payment for inclusion or promotion in anything we publish. All solution recommendations are based solely upon merit. The Secure the Grid Coalition and the Center for Security Policy are public benefit organizations and are wholly donor-supported.

Through the support of the Center for Security Policy, the STG Coalition aims to raise awareness about the national security threat of grid vulnerability and encourage the steps needed to neutralize it. Ellsworth's recent work includes drafting formal comments for the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) and formal motions to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), including a notable "Petition for Rulemaking" that was solely responsible for opening federal docket number EL23-69, which addressed the insufficiency of physical security at keystone electric utility substations.

Ellsworth began his career in finance in 1974, working with exchange-traded stock options before adopting a value-oriented investment strategy influenced by Benjamin Graham. By the 1990s, his career shifted to business leadership, where he took control of a struggling private enterprise, returned it to profitability, and secured small defense contracts. He administered the maintenance and repair of TEMPEST-certified microcomputer systems at the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command.

Following the sale of certain assets, Ellsworth retained a division which he renamed Secure Communications Corporation. The company secured an exclusive nationwide contract from a major defense contractor to develop a commercial market for a cutting-edge network security system used by the National Security Agency and other federal agencies. His expertise was solidified through writings on Intrusion Detection Systems, which have been cited internationally by academic institutions and major corporations.

The events of September 11, 2001, marked a pivotal shift in Ellsworth's career focus. He co-founded an educational organization, USAPACT, with colleagues from his defense contracting days. In 2015, he became actively involved as a volunteer with the Secure the Grid Coalition, an initiative of the Center for Security Policy, initially providing backup support to the Coalition's director, Tommy Waller. After serving as Acting Director for nine months when Waller was called to Marine Corps reserve duties, Ellsworth was appointed as a Co-Director of the Coalition following Waller's promotion to President and CEO of the Center for Security Policy.

For more information, reach out to Doug directly at doug.ellsworth@usapact.org

Further Reading:

• "FERC's failure to protect America's electric grid: A national security blind spot" - Article by Douglas Ellsworth examining FERC's denial of a complaint about Chinese-manufactured transformers posing security threats to the U.S. electric grid .
• "Chain of Command, Meet Supply Chain" - Ellsworth article examining military dependence on civilian infrastructure, particularly the electric grid .

"A Model of Resilience: Waldo County Maine's Off-Grid Emergency Operations Center" - Case study of a fully resilient county EOC designed to operate indefinitely during grid-down situations .

"Resilient Power Best Practices for Critical Facilities and Sites" - CISA guide providing comprehensive practices for implementing resilient power systems at critical facilities .

Nebraska Association of County Officials Briefing - Educational presentation covering grid threats, regulatory challenges, and solutions for local governments.

Comments to the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board - highlighting transformer vulnerability to ground induced currents and effective protective technologies like Neutral Blocking Devices .